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1 Introduction
Parents care for their children. This impacts on their decisions regarding time use and
consumption. How can we take this into account when analyzing household behavior?
Recently, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005; henceforth BCM) presented a col-
lective labor supply model that accounts for caring parents, and that has a number of
attractive theoretical and conceptual features. We provide a rst empirical applica-
tion of BCMs theoretical ideas. In doing so, we also present a number of extensions
of BCMs original analysis to enhance economic realism and to facilitate empirical
implementation. In this introductory section, we motivate BCMs collective model to
account for caring parents in the analysis of household behavior, and we articulate
the main contributions of the current study.
It is by now well established that the unitary model, which assumes that house-
holds behave as single decision makers, is not adequate to describe the observed
behavior of households consisting of multiple individuals. A most popular alterna-
tive to the unitary model is the collective model, which was originally suggested by
Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988). This collective model explicitly
recognizes that the household consists of multiple individuals who have their own
rational preferences. These individuals are assumed to take Pareto e¢ cient decisions
that result from an intrahousehold bargaining process.
Chiappori (1988, 1992) originally proposed a collective labor supply model that
starts from the rather standard assumption that individuals divide their time between
leisure and market work. Interestingly, this model e¤ectively does provide a better t
of household labor supply data than the unitary model.1 However, as Becker (1965)
already noticed, the underlying assumption is too restrictive: in usual settings, not
all non-market work can be considered as pure leisure, since time is also spent on
household production. Importantly, Apps and Rees (1996) point out that a model
which starts from the simple dichotomization of time into leisure and market work
may result in misleading welfare recommendations.2
In response to this rightful critique, Chiappori (1997) has proposed a collective
labor supply model that does include household production.3 However, the model
is again rather specic. It assumes a setting with a single market good and a single
domestically produced good, which are both privately consumed. In addition, the
sole inputs for the domestic good are the spousestime allocated to its production.
As such, the model does not allow for public consumption in a direct way, and it
abstracts from market goods that act as inputs in the household production process.
BCM presented an alternative model to account for household production in a
1See, for example, the empirical applications of Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Cherchye and
Vermeulen (2008).
2Donni (2008) derived the conditions that need to be satised for welfare analyses still to be valid
in the absence of information about the time allocation between market work and household work.
3See Aronsson, Daunfeldt and Wikström, (2001), Couprie (2007), and Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz
(2010) for empirical applications of the model.
2
collective labor supply setting.4 Their model has a number of attractive features.
Firstly, it assumes that the parentsindividual preferences depend not only on own
private consumption and leisure, but also on the childrens welfare. Childrens welfare
then acts as a public good, which is characterized as a Beckerian (1965) domestic good
that is produced by means of expenditures on children (like clothing and toys) and
parental time invested in children. The model is fully identiable in the sense that
parentsindividual preferences and the decision process, as summarized by the Pareto
weights, can be recovered from observed couplesbehavior alone.
From a conceptual point of view, an important motivation for BCMs collective
model is that it is particularly well-suited for intrahousehold welfare analysis. For
example, as argued by BCM, the model provides a natural framework to analyze
issues related to the targeting view. This view takes as a starting point that the
e¤ectiveness of a specic benet or tax also depends on the particular household
member to whom it has been targeted. This last point is most notably illustrated by
the rejection of the income pooling hypothesis on numerous occasions.5 In addition,
the abovementioned identiability result enables a sound analysis of statements such
as mothers care more for children than fathers.6
The theoretical and conceptual attractiveness of BCMs model begs for an empiri-
cal application. However, such an application does not yet exist. A likely explanation
is that the model implies severe data requirements. For example, it requires detailed
knowledge about how the households total expenditures are broken down in di¤erent
expenditure categories (including expenditures on children). Furthermore, the model
needs specic information on time use (including parental time invested in children).
The current paper lls this gap in the literature, and brings BCMs theoretical
ideas to observational data. More specically, we provide three contributions. Firstly,
we present a rst application to a (novel and unique) data set that contains all
necessary information to implement BCMs model. The data is drawn from the new
LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel that is gathered by
CentERdata; this panel is representative for the Dutch population. The LISS panel is
a regular social survey, to which a questionnaire was added about the intrahousehold
allocation of expenditures and detailed time use.7
4See Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2004) for additional discussion of the model.
5See, for example, Thomas (1990), Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Lund-
berg, Pollak and Wales (1997) and Duo (2003).
6Lewbel and Pendakur (2010) propose an alternative collective model that focuses on children.
This model di¤ers from our model in two important respects. Firstly, Lewbel and Pendakur only
focus on the allocation of expenditures and do not consider the allocation of time to market work,
leisure and parental time invested in children. Secondly, for identication purposes, they need to
make the assumption that individual resource shares do not vary with total household expenditures.
In addition, they need one of two restrictions on the individual preferences (either involving that
preferences for a particular good are similar across individuals or that individual preferences for a
particular good are similar across household types).
7Our data set is comparable to the one of Bonke and Browning (2009) in the sense that the
intrahousehold allocation of all expenditures is known. However, our data set is richer because it
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Secondly, we generalize BCMs original model to a setting with more than one
domestic good. This generalization seems warranted for the very same reason as
why a simple dichotomization between market work and leisure may obtain distorted
welfare analyses: parents do not only allocate their time to market work, parental
time and leisure, but also to household activities such as cleaning or gardening. We
will argue that BCMs identiability result extends to this generalized model.
Our nal contribution is that we propose and apply a novel estimation strategy for
our collective model. The strategy is directly based upon insights obtained through
the well-known two-stage allocation representation of the collective model (see, Chi-
appori, 1988, 1992), and starts from a dual characterization of the model. We will
argue that this approach considerably facilitates the derivation of a exible functional
form for the observables. In turn, this greatly benets the empirical implementation
of the theoretical model under study.
As we will discuss, the estimated model obtains intuitive results in terms of the
factors that impact on the parental preferences and the intrahousehold Pareto weights.
In addition, we show the usefulness of the model for empirical analysis of intrahouse-
hold welfare issues. For example, we will assess the impact of male and female wage
changes on the intrahousehold consumption of private goods and leisure, and on the
production of public goods (including childrens welfare); this complies with the tar-
geting view mentioned above. Next, we will empirically evaluate whether or not
mothers care more for their children than fathers.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical
model, which generalizes BCMs original model. Section 3 contains our empirical
application of this model. It presents our data set, proposes our estimation strategy
and discusses our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 The model
In this section, we introduce our collective labor supply model with home production,
which extends BCMs original model. Throughout, we will focus on a household with
two adults (i = 1; 2). The household further contains children who do not have
any bargaining power on their own. The adult members spend their time on leisure
(denoted by li), market work (denoted by mi) and household work. We make a
distinction between two types of household work: parental time invested in children
(denoted by hik) and other household work like cleaning or gardening (denoted by
also contains detailed information about the time use of the household members. In this respect,
another comparable survey is described in Browning and Gørtz (2006). This last survey also includes
detailed time use information. However, it focuses on a more limited set of consumption categories.
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hip).
8 For each adult member i, the time budget constraint thus equals:
li +mi + hik + h
i
p = 1; (1)
where we normalize the time endowment to one.
A unit of market work by member i is associated with a wage wi. The household
has a nonlabor income y. The income of the household is allocated to a Hicksian
composite good with a price that is normalized to one. We assume that the Hicksian
composite good is used for the private consumption of the adult members (c1 and
c2), expenditures on children (k) and expenditures on other public goods (p). This
results in the following household budget constraint:
c1 + c2 + k + p = y + w1m1 + w2m2: (2)
In contrast to what is usually the case, we observe the complete intrahousehold
consumption allocation in our data set (see Section 3). In other words, we do not
only observe how much of the households resources go to children and other public
goods, but also how the households private consumption c1 + c2 is allocated to both
adult members.
The allocation of the households income (as well as the size of this income)
depends on the individual preferences of the adult members and their respective bar-
gaining positions inside the household. The preferences of member i are represented
by the utility function
ui = ui
 
ci; li; uk
 
k; h1k; h
2
k

; up
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

: (3)
We will assume that the function ui
 
ci; li; uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) ; u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

is twice
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strongly concave.9 The subutility
functions uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

are assumed to have the same properties and,
in addition, to be homothetic (i.e., the household production process is characterized
by constant returns to scale).10 These subutilities represent two domestic goods of
which the output is unobserved. More specically, the domestic good uk stands for
the childrens utility that acts as a public good in the adult memberspreferences.
Similarly, the domestic good up can be interpreted as the joy of a clean and cosy
house (though other interpretations are of course also possible). Contrary to uk and
up, individual consumption ci and leisure li are assumed to be private goods (which
do not entail any external e¤ects).11
8All our results are easily generalized to apply to any number of household work types and public
goods. For simplicity, we restrict to two types of household work and public goods in what follows.
The same setting will be considered in our empirical application in Section 3.
9To save on notation, we will use expressions like f = f (x) in what follows, where f refers to a
function and f (x) to the value the function takes when its argument equals x.
10The assumption of homotheticity (or constant returns to scale) follows Pollak and Wachter
(1975) and will prove useful for our empirical specication (see Section 2.3).
11As is clear from above, the production process focused on is a household technology, which is not
necessarily related to individual technologies. See Pollak (2007) for a discussion on the connection
between individual and household production technologies.
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To conclude this introduction of the individual preferences, one important remark
is in order. It is clear from (3) that we assume that the childrens utility uk is produced
by means of parental time invested in children and expenditures on children. Still,
one can argue that uk also depends on, say, expenditures on housing. This poses
the problem that housing a¤ects the adult household membersutility both through
uk and up. This problem is very reminiscent to Gormans (1978) and Blundell and
Robins (2000) concept of latent separability.12 Latent separability generalizes weak
separability in the sense that goods are allowed to enter more than one subutility
function. However, in the current setting the data forces us to focus on a Hicksian
composite commodity with a price that is normalized to one, so that we cannot make
use of latent separability. Still, we do see the exploration of this latent separability
idea as an interesting avenue for follow-up research; e.g., future waves of the data set
used in the present study may generate the required price variation.
The adult membersbargaining positions depend on their wages w1 and w2, the
households nonlabor income y and (at least) two so-called distribution factors z1
and z2. The latter are dened as variables that a¤ect the bargaining position of the
adult members without a¤ecting their preferences nor the household budget constraint
(after controlling for total income). See Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009)
for a more detailed discussion.
Following Chiappori (1988, 1992) and BCM, we assume that the adult members
choose Pareto e¢ cient intrahousehold allocations. Therefore, observed allocations are
assumed to result from the following optimization programme:
max
l1;l2;h1k;h
2
k;h
1
p;h
2
p;c
1;c2;k;p

 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

u1
 
c1; l1; uk
 
k; h1k; h
2
k

; up
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

(4)
+
 
1    w1; w2; y; z1; z2 u2  c2; l2; uk  k; h1k; h2k ; up  p; h1p; h2p
subject to
c1 + c2 + k + p = y + w1m1 + w2m2
li +mi + hik + h
i
p = 1 (i = 1; 2) :
The Pareto weight  (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) represents the relative bargaining power of
member 1 and, as indicated earlier, depends on the adult memberswages, the house-
holds nonlabor income and the distribution factors. In what follows, we assume that
the Pareto weight is continuously di¤erentiable in its arguments. The households
optimal choices are observable functions of the same variables (i = 1; 2):
12In this respect, see also Pollak and Wachters (1975) discussion on the issue of joint production
in the household (i.e. the same inputs are used for multiple domestic outputs).
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li = li
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

ci = ci
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

hik = h
i
k
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

(5)
hip = h
i
p
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

k = k
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

p = p
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

:
At this point, it is worth stressing that the above system of equations is assumed
to be completely observed. A natural question now is whether this system of equa-
tions allows us to recover the underlying structural model that consists of both adult
membersindividual preferences and the decision process inside households (as sum-
marized by the Pareto weight).
The identiability of our model is guaranteed by Corollary 10 of Chiappori and
Ekeland (2009). This corollary focuses on a general collective model with both pri-
vate and public consumption. For this general case, Chiappori and Ekeland have
shown that if each adult member is associated with at least one exclusive good (i.e., a
good that is exclusively consumed by only one member), then the membersindirect
collective utility functions (i.e., indirect utility functions that take into account how
resources are allocated inside the household for given exogenous variables) can be
identied from observable household demand (5) alone. In our case, each adult mem-
ber i is associated with the exclusively consumed leisure li, while the nonexclusive
goods uk and up are publicly consumed. Moreover, as we will discuss in Section 3,
in our data set ci is an assignable good (i.e., a privately consumed good of which the
consumption is observable). Chiappori and Ekelands Corollary 10 further shows that
for any cardinalization of the indirect utilities, the Pareto weights are also identied.
This result thus implies complete identiability of our collective model.
We will give more intuition for this identiability result in the next two sub-
sections. To this end, we will use that we can also represent the solution to the
optimization programme (4) as stemming from a two-stage allocation process. In the
rst stage, the household members agree on the household public goods (via choosing
the expenditures for children, the other public expenditures and the time devoted to
household production) and an intrahousehold allocation of the residual nonlabor in-
come. In the second stage, each member maximizes her or his utility by choosing own
leisure and own private consumption conditional on the level of both domestic goods
and the budget constraint dened in the rst stage. The analysis of the two-stage
allocation process will also prove instrumental for our empirical application: we will
use it to design the empirical model that we will bring to the data.
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2.2 Second stage of the allocation process
The identiability of our model is best explained by rst focusing on the second stage.
The next subsection deals with the rst stage of the allocation process.
It is clear that the outputs uk and up of the household production process are not
observable. Still, the fact that we observe the inputs (i.e. (k; h1k; h
2
k) and
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

)
as functions of (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) allows us to recover uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

up
to a monotonically increasing transformation. This happens through the assumption
of cost minimization in the production of the public goods, which implies (j = k; p):
@uj(j;h1j ;h2j)
@h1j
@uj(j;h1j ;h2j)
@j
 1j
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

= w1 and
@uj(j;h1j ;h2j)
@h2j
@uj(j;h1j ;h2j)
@j
 2j
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

= w2: (6)
Making use of Frobeniustheorem (see, e.g., Afriat, 1977), these systems of partial
di¤erential equations can be integrated to respectively uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

(up to an increasing transformation) if the following symmetry conditions are satised
(j = k; p):
@1j
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

@h2j
+
@1j
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

@j
2j =
@2j
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

@h1j
+
@2j
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

@j
1j : (7)
In what follows, we will assume that particular cardinalizations for uk (k; h1k; h
2
k)
and up
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

have been identied in this way. In other words, we assume that
uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

are known functions of respectively (k; h1k; h
2
k) and 
p; h1p; h
2
p

. The latter variables are themselves known functions of (w1; w2; y; z1; z2),
which is inherited by uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

. This obtains the functions
uk (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) and up (w1; w2; y; z1; z2).
To exploit the idea of the conditional sharing rule, the output associated with the
domestic goods is xed to arbitrary levels: uk (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) = uk and up(w1; w2;
y; z1; z2) = up. Assuming that the matrix
"
@uk(:)
@z1
@uk(:)
@z2
@up(:)
@z1
@up(:)
@z2
#
is nonsingular in an appro-
priately dened subset of the domain of uk(w1; w2; y; z1; z2) and up(w1; w2; y; z1; z2),
we can make use of the implicit function theorem to express the distribution fac-
tors as functions of the observable exogenous variables and the levels uk and up:
z1 = z1
 
w1; w2; y; uk; up

and z2 = z2
 
w1; w2; y; uk; up

. The role of the two dis-
tribution factors becomes immediately clear: they serve to keep the output of the
domestic goods constant while allowing variation in the individual wages and the
nonlabor income.
We dene the adult membersconditional shares as follows (i = 1; 2):
i
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

= wili
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

+ ci
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2
  wi: (8)
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The shares 1 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) and 2 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) dene the conditional sharing
rule by distributing among the adult members the residual nonlabor income that is
left after purchasing the inputs in the household production process. We thus get:
1
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

+ 2
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

= (9)
y   k  w1; w2; y; z1; z2  w1h1k  w1; w2; y; z1; z2  w2h2k  w1; w2; y; z1; z2
 p  w1; w2; y; z1; z2  w1h1p  w1; w2; y; z1; z2  w2h2p  w1; w2; y; z1; z2 :
Let us introduce the following notation:  (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) = 1 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2)
and 2 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) = y   k   w1h1k   w2h2k   p   w1h1p   w2h2p   . Given the
above, l1 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2), l2 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) and  (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) are functions of
(w1; w2; y; z1
 
w1; w2; y; uk; up

; z2
 
w1; w2; y; uk; up

). However, because uk and up are
xed, l1 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2), l2 (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) and  (w1; w2; y; z1; z2) solely depend on
(w1; w2; y). Given cost minimization in the household production process and the
abovementioned properties of the subutility functions uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

,
there will be unique values for the inputs in the household production process that
generate the outputs uk and up. We denote these optimal input values by

k; h
1
k; h
2
k; p; h
1
p; h
2
p

.
Using y = y   k   w1h1k   w2h
2
k   p  w1h
1
p   w2h
2
p, we can then dene the following
individual maximization programmes for the second stage of the allocation problem:
max
l1;c1
u1
 
l1; c1; uk; up

(10)
subject to
w1l1 + c1 = w1 + ;
and
max
l2;c2
u2
 
l2; c2; uk; up

(11)
subject to
w2l2 + c2 = w2 + y   .
Chiappori (1988, 1992) proved that the observability of both membersindividual
labor supply functions allows us to recover the sharing rule up to a constant and the
individual preferences up to a translation. A similar result applies to the above set-
ting with household production, provided that two distribution factors are available.
The only di¤erence between Chiapporis original setting and BCMs extension with
household production is that the unidentied constant generally depends on uk and
up.
Importantly, we do not have such an unidentied constant in our case, which
implies that the sharing rule and individual preferences are completely identied.
The reason is that we observe c1 and c2 in our data set, which obtains two bound-
ary conditions in the individual integrability problems. Although Chiappori (1992)
demonstrated that the unidentied constant is welfare irrelevant in the sense that it
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does not a¤ect indirect utilities, the above result is useful. For example, it allows us to
uniquely characterize the shares that are going to the adult members. Such informa-
tion is very valuable for policy makers; e.g., recall our discussion in the introduction
on targeting benets or taxes to particular household members. More importantly,
as we will show below, observing the complete intrahousehold allocation of time and
resources considerably facilitates the identication of the rst stage of the allocation
process.
Summarizing, the optimal allocation in the second stage entails completely iden-
tied conditional individual collective indirect utilities (up to an increasing transfor-
mation that generally depends on uk and up):
v1
 
w1; ; uk; up

(12)
and
v2
 
w2; y   ; uk; up :
2.3 First stage of the allocation process
Let us now look at the rst stage of the allocation process. This stage focuses on the
optimal allocation of the households resources to the household public goods (via
choosing the expenditures for children, the other public expenditures and the time
devoted to household production) and to the adult membersshares of the residual
nonlabor income. When we interpret uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

as standard direct
utility functions, we can dene the following cost or expenditure functions (j = k; p):
ej
 
uj; w1; w2

= min
j;w1;w2

j + w1h1j + w
2h2j ;u
j
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

= uj

= xj: (13)
These cost functions give the minimal expenditures xj on the inputs
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

needed
to produce a quantity uj of the domestic good j. Since uk (k; h1k; h
2
k) and u
p
 
p; h1p; h
2
p

are assumed to be homothetic, the above cost functions will be of the form:
ej(uj; w1; w2) = gj
 
w1; w2

uj;
where gj is a linearly homogeneous price index.
We are now in a position to formulate the maximization programme associated
with the rst stage of the allocation process. This is achieved by substituting particu-
lar cardinalizations for the adult membersindirect utility functions in (12). The op-
timal choice of
 
1; 2; uk; up

is a solution to the following maximization programme:
max
1;2;uk;up

 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

v1
 
w1; 1; uk; up

(14)
+
 
1    w1; w2; y; z1; z2 v2  w2; 2; uk; up
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subject to
1 + 2 + gk
 
w1; w2

uk + gp
 
w1; w2

up = y:
This rst stage maximization programme corresponds to the one of Chiappori
and Ekelands (2009) general collective model with both private and public consump-
tion. The privately consumed goods are adult member is private consumption ci and
leisure li, while the nonexclusive goods uk and up are publicly consumed. Our model
thus directly ts into Chiappori and Ekelands (2009) Corollary 10, which implies
the identiability of our model. More specically, we cannot only recover how the
conditional shares i are allocated to ci and li, but also how the individuals allocate
the households resources over i, uk and up through Pareto e¢ cient intrahousehold
bargaining. In this respect, it is worth remarking that Chiappori and Ekeland obtain
recovery up to an unidentied constant that is associated with i. Like before, we
can identify this constant in our case because the complete intrahousehold allocation
of time and resources is observed in our data.
To recover the Pareto weights, we can make use of the rst-order conditions for
(14):

@v1
 
w1; 1; uk; up

@1
= (1  ) @v
2
 
w2; 2; uk; up

@2
()  = @v
2
 
w2; 2; uk; up

=@2
@v1 (w1; 1; uk; up) =@1 + @v2 (w2; 2; uk; up) =@2
:
This demonstrates that the Pareto weights correspond to the relative marginal utilities
of income for both adult members. As a result, we know the Pareto weights in addition
to the adultspreferences over the public domestic goods and private consumption.
This is obtained by only making use of observable allocations at the household level
(see (5)). We thus conclude complete identiability of our structural collective model.
One nal remark is in order. The identication result in Chiappori and Ekelands
(2009) Corollary 10 does not depend on the presence of any distribution factors.
Still, in our model, and following BCM, we assume that we have two distribution
factors available. The reason is that these two factors allow the two-stage allocation
representation of our structural model discussed above. This will prove useful for
explicitly building our empirical model (in Section 3.2).
3 Empirical application
3.1 Data
We will apply the above collective model to a sample of households drawn from
the new LISS panel (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) that is
gathered by CentERdata. The basic panel consists of 5000 households (comprising
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8000 individuals) and is representative for the Dutch population.13 The rst wave
of the LISS panel was gathered in 2008. The LISS Core Study is a longitudinal
study, which is repeated yearly and is designed to follow changes in the life course
and living conditions of the panel members. It is comparable in content to standard
social surveys. In addition to the LISS Core Study, researchers can collect their own
data via online questionnaires to the panel members. We made use of this possibility
to gather the data necessary to conduct our analysis. This obtains a unique data
set that combines detailed assignable expenditures and time use information with a
battery of data gathered through a regular social survey.
We added a module on time use and consumption to the LISS panel. This ques-
tionnaire was given to all household members who were at least sixteen years old. The
time use data were collected by means of survey questions about the time spent on a
set of time use categories during the past seven days. As indicated by Browning and
Gørtz (2006), such questions can be informative and have the advantage that they
avoid infrequency problems associated with diary-based surveys. Moreover, they are
less time consuming than surveys based on detailed diaries. LISS-respondents had to
ll out their time use on thirteen exhaustive categories during the past seven days.14
For each category, a number of activities was given as an example along with other
useful information.15
The consumption module is also based on survey questions on normal individual
and household (nondurable) expenditures. The set up of the questionnaire is partly
based on the recommendations by Browning, Crossley and Weber (2003), who con-
clude that, although survey measures are more noisy than diary measures, they do
contain a useful signal on individual consumption. A rst set of questions refers to
expenditures on twelve categories of goods and services that can be argued to be
publicly consumed by the household. Examples of such expenditures are (imputed)
rent, expenditures on utilities or formal day care for young children. Although ex-
penditures on food at home are intrinsically private in nature, expenditures on food
and drinks used at home and outside home with (other members of) the household
appeared in the public expenditures categories. Still, we added a follow-up question
where all respondents had to indicate how much of these expenditures they personally
consumed. The next set of questions in the consumption module refers to the private
expenditures of the respondents, which were gathered in nine categories. Examples
of such personal expenditures were food and drinks consumed outside home (but not
with other members of the household), clothing, expenditures on leisure activities or
personal care. The questionnaire on private expenditures of children less than sixteen
13Households without any internet access are provided with a basic computer (a SimPC) that
enables them to connect to the internet.
14Since we wanted to maximize the response rate, the questionnaires were online in early September
and early December. It is expected that the time use for regular working weeks is fairly well captured.
However, the normal yearly time use on summer holidays will be underestimated.
15See the Appendix for detailed lists of the time use categories, public expenditure categories and
private expenditure categories.
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years old were responded by one of the adult members.
The set of households used for this study was subject to the following sample
selection rules. We focused attention on couples with children, where both adult
members participate to the labor market. After deleting the households with im-
portant missing information (mostly, incomplete information of one of the spouses),
we obtained a sample of 212 couples with children. This sample is relatively small.
Future research could focus on including non-participation to the labor market in our
theoretical model, which would yield a considerable number of extra observations; see
also are discussion in the concluding section.
As mentioned before, the time use and consumption module is complemented
with information from the LISS Core Study. More specically, information on the
household composition, the ages of the household members, their wage rates and the
individual and household nonlabor incomes are added. Importantly, the wage rates
were not derived by dividing an individuals labor income by the number of hours
worked according to the time use module, but rather through division of the labor
income by the hours worked according to the LISS Core Study. This will help us to
avoid division bias in our empirical application. As indicated before, we assume two
distribution factors for our collective labor supply model. The distribution factors in
this study will be the husbands share in the spousesindividual nonlabor incomes
and their age di¤erence.
To conclude this data subsection, we report some summary statistics on the core
variables used in this study. The adult membersprivate expenditures (c1 and c2)
are equal to the sum of all the individual expenditures on the nine categories of
goods and services in the private expenditures questionnaire and the own share in
the expenditures on food and drinks (which is obtained by the follow-up question on
own food consumption in the public expenditures questionnaire). The expenditures
on children (k) are equal to the sum of the expenditures on child care (obtained
through the public expenditures questionnaire) and the sum of all the childrens
private expenditures (obtained through the private expenditures questionnaire lled
out either by children who are at least sixteen years old or by one the adult members
for children less than sixteen years old). The expenditures on the other public good (p)
equal the sum of the expenditures on the twelve categories in the public expenditures
questionnaire minus the expenditures on food and drinks and expenses on child care.
The adult memberstime spent on market labor (m1 and m2) is equal to the sum of
the time spent on paid work and commuting. Parental time invested in children (h1k
and h2k) includes all time spent on activities with children (such as dressing, playing,
going to the doctor, etc.). Finally, time spent on other public goods (h1p and h
2
p)
equals the sum of all time spent on home work (cleaning, gardening, cooking, etc.)
and administrative tasks related to the own household.
As is clear from Table 1, wives have, on average, slightly less private expenditures
(302 euro per month) than their husbands (311 euro per month). Expenditures on
children are, on average, equal to about 479 euro per month. Most of the households
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Table 1: Summary statistics LISS couples with children
Husband W ife Household
M ean Std . dev. M ean Std . dev . M ean Std . dev .
Exp enditures
Private exp enditures (EUR per month) 311.08 217.10 302.64 182.41
Exp enditures on ch ildren (EUR per month) 479.15 493.21
O ther public exp enditures (EUR per month) 1827.77 875.32
T im e use
Market lab or (hours p er week; incl. commuting) 47.71 11.60 28.54 11.32
Child care (hours p er week) 9.04 8.52 15.43 13.79
O ther home work (hours p er week) 11.66 8.22 20.65 11.75
So cio-econom ic variab les
Age 42.89 7.43 40.61 7.37
Wage rate (EUR per hour) 10.71 3.76 9.83 5.19
Household nonlab or incom e (EUR per month) 130.00 330.11
Husbands share in ind iv idual non lab or incom e 0.59 0.21
Age di¤erence 2.27 3.14
Number of ch ildren 2.02 0.75
expenditures are spent on other public goods: on average, households spend about
1828 euro per month on these goods. Next, when looking at the adult members
time use, we nd that husbands spend substantially more hours on market work
than their wives: on average, husbands work about 47.7 hours per week for pay
(including commuting), while wives supply about 28.5 hours per week. A di¤erent
picture emerges when focusing on child care and other home work. Husbands spend
on average about 9 hours per week to their children, while they are engaged in other
home work for about 11.7 hours per week. The gures for women are almost double:
average time devoted to child care and other home work equals respectively about
15.4 and 20.7 hours per week. If we add both market work and home work together,
it appears that husbands work a bit more than their wives (68.4 versus 64.6 hours per
week). This result does not di¤er that much from results obtained in earlier studies
based on di¤erent data (see, e.g., Burda, Hamermesh and Weil, 2008).
3.2 Parametric specication
To introduce the parametric specication that we use for our theoretical model, we
shall refer to the models two-stage allocation representation discussed before. The
reason is that it turns out to be impossible to derive a exible closed form specication
for the observables on the basis of a direct utility representation of the adult members
preferences, if we want to preserve the assumption that leisure and individual con-
sumption are not separable from the unobserved outputs of the household production
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process. Essentially, the two-stage allocation representation allows us to make use of
individual indirect utility functions, which e¤ectively facilitates the derivation of a
rather exible functional reduced form for the observables.
We assume that the second stages adult memberspreferences over leisure and
own consumption, conditional on the amount of domestic goods produced, can be
represented by the following indirect utility functions (i = 1; 2):
vi
 
wi; i; uk; up

=
ln (wi + i)  ln ai  wi;uk; up
(wi)
i ; (15)
where ln ai
 
wi;uk; up

=
 
i1 + 
i
2 lnu
k + i3 lnu
p

lnwi. These indirect utility func-
tions belong to the PIGLOG class. In fact, using that the Hicksian composite com-
modity has a normalized price equal to one, they exactly coincide with the indirect
utility function underlying Deaton and Muellbauers (1980) Almost Ideal Demand
System. Applying Roys identity to these indirect utility functions results in the
following (conditional) Marshallian demand for leisure and own consumption:
li =
" 
i1 + 
i
2 lnu
k + i3 lnu
p

+ i ln
 
wi + i
ai
 
wi;uk; up
!# (wi + i)
wi
(16)
ci =
" 
1  i1   i2 lnuk   i3 lnup
  i ln wi + i
ai
 
wi;uk; up
!#  wi + i :
Let us now focus on the rst stage allocation of the households nonlabor income
y to
 
1; 2; uk; up

(see (14)). We rst need to specify the household production
technologies that transform expenditures on public goods and the spousestime spent
on home production into the domestic goods uk and up. We assume that these
technologies are of the Cobb-Douglas form (j = k; p):
uj
 
j; h1j ; h
2
j

= 1j lnh
1
j + 
2
j lnh
2
j + 
3
j ln j; (17)
where
P
i 
i
j = 1.
The above technologies are homothetic, which implies that the budget constraint
associated with the rst stage of the allocation process has a simple form that is linear
in
 
1; 2; uk; up

. Given the above specications of the individual indirect utility
functions and the household production technologies, the rst stage maximization
programme boils down to:
max
1;2;uk;up

 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2
 ln (w1 + 1)  ln a1  w1;uk; up
(w1)
1
!
+
 
1    w1; w2; y; z1; z2 ln (w2 + 2)  ln a2  w2;uk; up
(w2)
2
!
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subject to
1 + 2 + gk
 
w1; w2

uk + gp
 
w1; w2

up = y;
where gj (w1; w2) =
h
(w1)
1j (w2)
2j
i
(j = k; p). A su¢ cient condition for a theoreti-
cally consistent rst stage allocation is that the parameters i2 and 
i
3 in the functions
ln ai
 
w1;uk; up

(i = 1; 2) are negative. This condition will be imposed in the estima-
tion process by the functions il =   exp
 eil, where eil is estimated (i = 1; 2; l = 2; 3).
Assuming an interior solution, the Lagrangian associated with the above maxi-
mization problem results in the following rst-order conditions (where  is the La-
grange multiplier):
@L
@1
=

(w1)
1
1
(w1 + 1)
   = 0
@L
@2
=
1  
(w2)
2
1
(w2 + 2)
   = 0
@L
@uk
=   
(w1)
1
12 lnw
1
uk
  (1  )
(w2)
2
22 lnw
2
uk
  gk  w1; w2 = 0
@L
@up
=   
(w1)
1
13 lnw
1
up
  (1  )
(w2)
2
23 lnw
2
up
  gp  w1; w2 = 0
@L
@
= y   1   2   gk  w1; w2uk   gp  w1; w2up:
Rewriting obtains:
w1 + 1 =
1


(w1)
1
w2 + 2 =
1

(1  )
(w2)
2 (18)
gk
 
w1; w2

uk =
1

"
  
(w1)
1
1
2 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
2 lnw
2
#
gp
 
w1; w2

up =
1

"
  
(w1)
1
1
3 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
3 lnw
2
#
:
Summing left- and right-hand sides of these equations, while taking into account that
they add up to the households full budget, results in:
w1 + w2 + y =
1

"

(w1)
1

1   12 + 13 lnw1+ (1  )
(w2)
2

1   22 + 23 lnw2
#
 1

X
 
w1; w2; 

;
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which allows us to derive an expression for 1

. Substituting this expression in (18)
gives the following closed form solutions to the rst stage maximization problem:
1 =
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )

(w1)
1   w1
2 =
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
(1  )
(w2)
2   w2
uk =
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
1
gk (w1; w2)
"
  
(w1)
1
1
2 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
2 lnw
2
#
(19)
up =
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
1
gp (w1; w2)
"
  
(w1)
1
1
3 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
3 lnw
2
#
:
Finally, following Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008) we assume that the
Pareto weight of the rst adult member is of the form:

 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

=
exp

1 + 2
w1
w2
+ 3y + 4z1 + 5z2

1 + exp
 
1 + 2
w1
w2
+ 3y + 4z1 + 5z2
 : (20)
Clearly, this Pareto weight will be between zero and one as the theory requires. By
construction, this property extends to the spouses Pareto weight.
To obtain the individualsleisure and private consumption as functions of (w1; w2; y; z1; z2),
we substitute the rst stage functions (19) in the second stage functions (16) (i = 1; 2):
li =
"
Ai + i
 
ln
 
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
i
(wi)
i
!
  Ai lnwi
!#


w1+w2+y
X(w1;w2;)
i
(wi)
i

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1  Ai  i ln w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
i
(wi)
i
!
  Ai lnwi
!#

 
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
i
(wi)
i
!
;
where
Ai  i1 + i2 ln
 
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
1
gk (w1; w2)
"
  
(w1)
1
1
2 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
2 lnw
2
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+i3 ln
 
w1 + w2 + y
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1
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"
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and
 = 
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

1 = 
 
w1; w2; y; z1; z2

2 = 1    w1; w2; y; z1; z2 :
To obtain the inputs of the household production process as functions of (w1; w2; y; z1; z2),
we start from the cost functions gk (w1; w2)uk and gp (w1; w2)up that are associated
with the two domestic goods (see (13)). Applying Shephards lemma to these cost
functions, and substituting the observable expressions for uk and up obtained via the
rst stage allocation (19) in the resulting Hicksian demands, obtains the following
specication for the observable inputs of the household production process:
h1k =
1k
w1
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
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1
2 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
2 lnw
2
#
h2k =
2k
w2
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
"
  
(w1)
1
1
2 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
2 lnw
2
#
k =
 
1  1k   2k
 w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
"
  
(w1)
1
1
2 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
2 lnw
2
#
h1p =
1p
w1
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
"
  
(w1)
1
1
3 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
3 lnw
2
#
h2p =
2p
w2
w1 + w2 + y
X (w1; w2; )
"
  
(w1)
1
1
3 lnw
1   (1  )
(w2)
2 
2
3 lnw
2
#
p =
 
1  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2p
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:
The system that is brought to the data thus consists of 10 equations. More
specically, we will model
 
l1; c1; l2; c2; h1k; h
2
k; k; h
1
p; h
2
p; p

as observable functions of
(w1; w2; y; z1; z2).
To avoid an overspecied model, we decided not to include any taste shifters
in the individual preferences. Given the restrictions on the selected sample, it can
be argued that this is not too much of an issue here. However, we do account for
observed heterogeneity with respect to the number of children (K) in the production
process, by using the functions ij =
exp(ij1+ij2K)
1+exp(ij1+ij2K)+exp(ij1+ij2K)
(i = 1; 2; j = k; p),
where 1j1; 
1
j2; 
2
j1 and 
2
j2 are estimated. These functions guarantee that the 
i
js are
all positive and are smaller than one, as the theory requires.
To account of unobservable heterogeneity across households, we add additive er-
rors to the system equations. These errors are assumed to be uncorrelated across
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households but are allowed to correlate across commodities within households. The
system is estimated by means of the feasible generalized nonlinear least squares esti-
mator (see Greene, 2008).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Estimation results
The system of equations forming our structural collective model is highly nonlinear.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that we found several local minima. We selected
the lowest local minimum found. Still, we also conducted a robustness check with the
parameter values from the other minima found. It is comforting that these additional
exercises provided a broad picture that is qualitatively similar to the one reported
here.
Table 2 shows our estimation results; adult member 1 is the husband and adult
member 2 is the wife in the household. Despite our relatively small dataset, most
parameters turn out to be precisely estimated.16 Leisure appears to be a luxury
good for both husbands and wives since the estimates of 1 and 2 are positive.
Leisure and individual consumption turn out to be nonseparable from the outputs of
the household production process: both domestic goods have a signicant impact on
both spousesleisure and consumption (see the estimates of e12, e13, e22 and e23).
Let us now focus on the household production technologies. The estimates are
most easily interpreted when we take into account how the estimates of ijl (i = 1; 2;
j = p; k; l = 1; 2) feed into the estimate of ij (which -to recall- equals
exp(1j1+1j2K)
1+exp(1j1+1j2K)+exp(2j1+2j2K)
for K the number of children). The latter coe¢ cients can be interpreted as the cost
shares of the inputs for given total production costs of the domestic goods. It turns
out that a higher number of children is, all else equal, associated with a lower average
cost share of male time spent on children in the production of the public good uk
while it is associated with higher cost shares of female time spent on children and
expenditures on children. The same story applies to the production of the public
good up.
To conclude, we consider the parameters in the husbands Pareto weight. An
increase in the husbands relative wage turns out to have a signicantly positive
impact on his Pareto weight, ceteris paribus. Importantly, because the husband
and the wife have di¤erent preferences, this implies a strong rejection of the unitary
model (which -to recall- models households as if they were single decision making
units). Further, we nd that the households nonlabor income does not seem to
16The covariance matrix associated with feasible generalized nonlinear least squares makes use of
so-called pseudoregressors that involve derivatives of the regression functions. These derivatives were
obtained numerically by means of the method of Goldfeldt and Quandt. Still, the approximation
error can be substantial given our highly nonlinear system with parameters simultaneously appearing
in many terms (see Greene, 2008).
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Table 2: Structural estimation results
Estimate Std. error
Preference parameters
111 0.98* 0.07e12 [uk] -2.32* 0.14e13 [up] -1.34* 0.28
1 0.20* 0.02
211 0.94 0.79e22 [uk] -2.88* 0.02e23 [up] -2.70* 0.02
2 0.14* 0.02
Household production parameters
1k1 1.54* 0.02
1k2 [children] -0.49* 0.02
2k1 0.27* 0.05
2k2 [children] -0.02 0.02
1p1 -0.16* 0.07
1p2 [children] -0.10* 0.03
2p1 -1.65* 0.11
2p2 [children] 0.12* 0.01
Pareto weight parameters
1 -1.43* 0.06
2 [w1=w2] 1.25* 0.29
3 [y] 1.65 3.46
4 [husbands share in nonlabor income] 0.00* 0.00
5 [age husband minus age wife] 0.16* 0.05
Note: Coe¢ cient estim ates were obtained by the feasib le generalized nonlinear least squares estim ator. An asterisk
denotes sign icance at the 5 p er cent sign icance level. The expressions in brackets refer to the ob jects that are
related to the resp ective param eters.
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have a signicant impact on the husbands Pareto weight. However, the husbands
share in the households nonlabor income does have a signicantly positive (albeit
economically negligible) impact on his Pareto weight. We remark that this implies
a further rejection of the income pooling hypothesis (consistent with earlier results
mentioned in the introduction). Finally, we observe that the age di¤erence between
the husband and his spouse positively and signicantly inuences his Pareto weight.
3.3.2 Changing wages: e¤ects on the intrahousehold allocation of re-
sources
Given the complexity of our model, the magnitudes of the estimated parameters are
not always easy to grasp. Therefore, in what follows we provide some graphical illus-
trations of the impact of male and female wage changes on the dependent variables
in our model. Generally, this impact depends on the complex interaction between in-
dividual preferences, intrahousehold bargaining and the households production tech-
nologies. Our following discussion will illustrate the usefulness of the collective model
for assessing the e¤ects of wage changes on the intrahousehold consumption of pri-
vate goods and leisure, and on the production of public goods (including childrens
welfare). As discussed in the introduction, such an analysis can be instrumental for
evaluating targeting considerations related to (in casu earned income) benets or
taxes.
Figure 1 focuses on the impact of a change in the husbands wage on the dependent
variables. The wage change runs from the rst decile to the tenth decile in the male
wage distribution, while the other explanatory variables are xed at their means
(including the females wage). The upper left panel of the gure focuses on the
leisure and the private consumption of both husbands and wives. The upper right
panel shows the time spent on market labor. The two panels at the bottom show the
time and expenditures spent on children and the other domestic good (respectively
in the left and the right panel).
As is clear from the gure, the husbands time spent on market work increases
when his wage increases. Such a result would also be observed in a standard labor
supply model when the substitution e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect. This increase
is accompanied by not only a decrease in his leisure but also a decrease in the time
spent on children and other household work. At the same time, the husbands own
private consumption rises dramatically. In addition, also the households expenditures
on both public goods increase. This clearly illustrates the trade-o¤ between, on the
one hand, own consumption and, on the other hand, leisure and the utility derived
from the public goods (uk and up).
A di¤erent picture emerges when we look at the impact on the female dependent
variables of changing the male wage. It turns out that female leisure decreases as well,
while we observe an increase in time spent on house work and market labor (at least
when the initial male wage is su¢ ciently high). Note that this compensates the males
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Figure 1: Impact of change in male wage on dependent variables
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decrease in time spent on children and the other domestic good. Interestingly, also
the wifes private consumption increases when the husbands wage increases, but at a
slower pace than the husbands private consumption. Of course, this should not be too
surprising. Since both spouses supply more market labor hours, the couples income
increases. Part of this income is spent on the public goods, while the remainder is
allocated to both spousesprivate consumption. The latter happens more in favor of
the husband, given his increased Pareto weight following his wage rise.
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of a change in the wifes wage on the dependent
variables (while, again, keeping the other explanatory variables xed at their means).
The pattern in this gure is somewhat di¤erent from the one in Figure 1. While
an increase in the male wage decreases the husbands leisure, we now nd that the
wifes leisure initially increases and then slightly decreases when her wage increases.
A reverse picture applies to market labor: when the initial wage is low, female time
spent on market labor decreases when wage increases, while it increases again when
her wage gets above the average wage.
Next, we obtain a similar picture as before for household production. Specically,
time spent on children and the other domestic good decreases when female wage
increases. This decrease is compensated by an increase in the time spent on both
public goods by the husband. At the same time male leisure decreases while male
time spent on market work initially increases. This last e¤ect clearly demonstrates
the negative impact on the husbands Pareto weight of an increase in the wifes wage.
As for consumption, it is clear from Figure 2 that a rise in the wifes wage also
implies an increase in both spousesprivate consumption, though the pattern clearly
di¤ers. In addition, there is an increase in the expenditures on both public goods.
This again illustrates the trade-o¤ between, on the one hand, private consumption
and leisure and, on the other hand, the utility derived from the public goods.
3.3.3 Mothers versus fathers: who cares more for their children (and
other public consumption)?
So far, we have focused on the impact of male and female wage changes on the
key variables of the model. A closely related exercise analyzes the extent to which
di¤erences between the husbandsand wivespreferences inuence the amountsof
public goods (uk and up) that are produced inside the household. Such an analysis
allows us to shed light on a statement like mothers care more for children than
fathers, which is often made with respect to the widely observed phenomenon that
changes of the male and female nonlabor incomes have a di¤erential impact on the
health of children and expenditures on children (see, for example, Thomas, 1990, and
Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997). To tackle this question, we focus on couples with
characteristics equal to their average in the population. To facilitate a ceteris paribus
comparison, the average of the spouseswages is the average across both sexes (which
equals about ten euro). Specically, the full (respectively dotted) lines in Figure 3
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Figure 2: Impact of change in female wage on dependent variables
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Figure 3: Impact of change in male and female wages on household goods
correspond to a couple where the wifes (respectively husbands) wage is xed to this
average wage. The left panel then shows the impact of an increase in respectively the
husbands and the females wage on the childrens utility (uk). The right panel shows
the impact of wage changes on the production of the other domestic good (up).
The left panel of Figure 3 all but suggests that mothers e¤ectively care more for
children than fathers. To see this, compare two couples. The rst couple is situated
on the full line (which -to recall- corresponds to an average wage for the female that
equals ten euro). Assume for this couple that the husband has an hourly wage of,
say, seven euro (which is below the average wage). The second couple is situated on
the dotted line (with an average wage for the male that equals ten euro), and we now
assume that the female has an hourly wage of seven euro. The gure illustrates that
the childrens utility is actually higher in the second couple. This provides evidence
against the above statement, since in the rst couple the wife has a higher bargaining
power than in the second couple. This higher bargaining power is reected in a higher
Pareto weight for the wife, which implies that the households choices are more in
line with her own preferences. A similar conclusion holds if we compare a couple
on the full line where the husband has a higher than average wage (say, thirteen
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euro) with a couple on the dotted line where the wife has a higher than average wage
(again thirteen euro): the utility of children is higher for the rst couple, although
the di¤erence is now much less pronounced than before. Again, this implies that a
higher bargaining power for the female is associated with a (slightly) lower utility for
the children, which provides all but evidence in favor of the above statement. Finally,
if we consider the right panel of Figure 3, which pertains to the other domestic good
(up), we observe basically the same pattern as for the childrens utility. In fact, the
e¤ects are even more pronounced in this case.
4 Conclusion
We proposed a collective labor supply model with household production that gener-
alizes an original model of BCM. Adultsindividual preferences do not only depend
on own leisure and the individual private consumption of market goods, but also on
the consumption of domestic goods. This last category of goods is the output of
combining goods bought at the market with individualstime. For example, one of
our domestic goods is the childrens welfare, which is produced by expenditures on
children and parental time invested in the children. In our model, we also allow for
other domestic goods, which extends the original analysis of BCM.
We applied our model to new and unique data with detailed information about
the individualstime use and the intrahousehold allocation of all expenditures. The
application uses a novel estimation strategy that builds upon the familiar two-stage
allocation representation of the collective model. This estimation strategy allows for a
exible functional specication of observables, which is interesting from an empirical
point of view.
Our empirical results for a sample of Dutch couples with children reveal some
interesting patterns. Firstly, the spousespreferences turn out to signicantly depend
on the consumption of domestically produced goods (including childrens welfare).
Next, the spousesPareto weights vary signicantly with the individual wages and
the share in the households nonlabor income. Finally, we do not nd evidence that
mothers care more for their children than fathers. By contrast, when focusing on a
couple with average characteristics, our results even suggest an opposite pattern for
the sample under study. This is at odds with earlier results that were mainly obtained
for data from developing countries (see, e.g., Thomas, 1990).
One issue that we left for future work is that of non-participation in employment;
see Donni (2003) and Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2007) for collective
models with non-participation in a setting without household production. Such an
extension with non-participation would not only be useful from a theoretical perspec-
tive. It would also greatly benet practical applications, in that it can imply a lot of
additional degrees of freedom (e.g., women with young children who do not supply
any market labor). A closely related issue is that children should probably be treated
as endogenous in the household model (as suggested by Apps and Rees, 2001). We
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have ignored this in the current study, but we do consider it as an important topic
for further research.
Appendix
A. Time use categories
(1) paid work (excluding time spent on commuting); (2) commuting (for work or
school); (3) home work (cleaning, doing the dishes, cooking, shopping, gardening,
do it yourself, etc. but no tasks related to caring for children or other persons);
(4) personal care (washing, dressing, eating, going to the hairdresser, going to the
doctor, etc.); (5) activities with children (washing, dressing, playing, reading, go-
ing to the doctor, etc.); (6) helping parents (administrative tasks, washing, dressing,
going to the doctor, etc.); (7) helping other family members (administrative tasks,
washing, dressing, going to the doctor, etc.); (8) helping other persons who are not
family members (administrative tasks, washing, dressing, going to the doctor, etc.);
(9) leisure activities (watching TV, reading, sports, hobbies, visiting friends or fam-
ily, travelling, going out, etc.); (10) schooling (day or evening education, vocational
training, language training, etc.); (11) administrative tasks related to own household;
(12) sleeping and relaxing (sleeping, thinking, meditating, etc.); (13) other activities
not mentioned above.
B. Public expenditure categories
The public good categories in the data are the following: (1) expenditures on mort-
gages (rent and payment); (2) rent without expenditures on electricity and heating;
(3) utilities (heating, electricity, water, telephone, internet, etc. but without insur-
ances); (4) transportation costs (public transport, gasoline, etc., but no insurances
and purchase of transportation means); (5) insurances (house, car, health, etc.); (6)
child care (kindergarten, after school care, guest parent, home work supervision, etc.);
(7) alimony and nancial support to children who do not live at home (any longer);
(8) expenditures to service debt (but no mortgages); (9) trips and holidays with (part
of) the family (airplane tickets, hotel, restaurant, etc.); (10) expenditures related to
cleaning the house or gardening; (11) food and drinks used at home; and (12) other
public expenditures not mentioned above.
C. Private expenditure categories
The private good categories in the data are the following: (1) food and drinks outside
home (restaurant, pub, company restaurant, etc. but no expenditures consumed with
(part of) the family; (2) cigarettes and other tobacco products; (3) clothing (clothing,
shoes, jewelry, etc.); (4) personal care and services (hair care, body care, manicure,
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hair dressers, etc. but no medical expenditures); (5) medical expenditures not covered
by an insurance (medicines, doctor, dentist, hospital, maternity grant, glasses, hearing
device, etc.); (6) leisure activities (lm, theater, hobbies, sports, photography, books,
CDs, DVDs, expenditures related to traveling without the family, etc.); (7) schooling
(courses, tuition fees, etc.); (8) gifts (to family members, friends, charity, etc.); and
(9) other private expenditures not mentioned above.
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